The United States Supreme Court’s 1948 ruling in Shelley v. Kraemer famously disallowed state courts from enforcing racially restrictive covenants. Such covenants are, in essence, private legal obligations included in the deed to a property requiring that only members of a certain race be allowed to occupy the property. Because it prohibited are unjust, the stated legal rationale for the Shelley decision has nevertheless proven to be problematic.
The Shelley Court relied on the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which grants equal protection under the law to all U.S. citizens. This amendment had long been held to apply to state actors but not individuals. Shelley did not purport to alter this. But where, then, was the state action that property, it followed from Shelley’s analysis that judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants also was unconstitutional.
Shelley’s attribution logic threatened to dissolve the distinction between state action, to which Fourteenth Amendment limitations apply, and private action, which falls outside of the Fourteenth Amendment’s purview. After all, Shelley’s approach, consistently applied, would require individuals to conform their private agreements to constitutional standards whenever, as is almost always the case, fact that statutory limitations on the identical speech would represent an unconstitutional violation of free speech.
Additionally, there is a particularly noxious aspect of the Shelley Court’s analytics—namely, the Court’s conclusion that racially restrictive covenants themselves were perfectly legal. The legal rationale behind the Shelley decision thus failed to target the genuine problem with racially the covenants’ enforcement but their substantive content.
What this question is testing
Anticipate
This is a Primary Purpose question, so step back and ask: across the whole passage, what is the author doing?
The author opens by saying the outcome of Shelley v. Kraemer was rightly celebrated — but immediately pivots to: the legal reasoning is problematic. The next three paragraphs are all in service of that critique. Paragraph 2 explains how the Court reasoned. Paragraph 3 shows the reasoning would erase the line between state and private action, and that courts since haven't actually followed it. Paragraph 4 names the deepest issue: the rationale leaves the covenants themselves legal, which misses the real problem.
Goal
Looking for an answer that names this as questioning a particular ruling's reasoning, at the level of the whole passage. Common traps to watch for:
Answers that defend or extend the rationale — the author is doing the opposite
Answers that grab onto a single sub-topic from one paragraph (the state/private distinction) instead of the overall purpose
Answers that target the Constitution itself rather than the Court's reasoning
Reading along? Open the full official question in LawHub — we show a fragment here and keep the reasoning in our own words.