The more profitable a corporation is, the more valuable its managers’ time is.
Conclusion (so)
Highly profitable corporations can save money by giving their employees expensive bonuses.
Evidence
Highly profitable corporations can save money by reducing the monitoring done by managers, as long as the employees are given strong incentives to keep working hard.
It's very costly for highly profitable companies to have their managers spending time monitoring employees.
Evaluate
This has a Plan / Goal type conclusion, and it also has a New Concept in the Conclusion (the Plan: expensive bonuses).
We can spell out the how the Plan is supposed to take us to the Goal: giving expensive bonuses will provide employees with strong incentives to keep working hard (so that managers don't have to spend time monitoring them), so that the corporation can save money.
We can also try to think through potential objections, by asking ourselves,
How could we give our employees expensive bonuses, but they don't have a strong incentive to keep working hard / or they still need just as much monitoring from managers?
- maybe if the bonus feels guaranteed (rather than merit-based), then it doesn't really provide any incentive to work harder.
- maybe employees start competing with each other so much to win the biggest bonus, that they fight more and thus need more supervision from managers to moderate the disputes.
Goal
Let's look for a Missing Link, connecting "expensive bonuses" to "strong incentives to work hard".
Or let's look for a Defender style answer, ruling out a potential objection to the Plan's success.