Common sense suggests that we know our own thoughts directly, but that we infer the thoughts of other people. The former process is noninferential and infallible, while the latter is based on others’ behavior and can always be wrong. But this assumption is challenged by experiments in psychology demonstrating that in certain are wrong to think of ourselves as having noninferential and infallible access to our own thoughts.
Recognizing an obligation to explain why we cling so tenaciously to an illusory belief in noninferential and infallible knowledge of our own thoughts, these psychologists suggest that this illusion is analogous to what happens to us when we become experts in a particular area. Greater expertise appears to change not only our in our identification of what we ourselves think because we believe we are perceiving it directly.
In claiming that we have only inferential access to our thoughts, the psychologists come perilously close to claiming that we base our inferences about what we ourselves are thinking solely on observations of our own external behavior. But, in fact, their arguments do not commit them to this claim; the psychologists suggest that contradicts our own. Thus, they are crucial in creating the illusion of noninferentiality and infallibility.
What this question is testing
Your task
Find the choice that makes the argument's conclusion less likely to be true.
Common trap
Answers that look negative but attack a claim the argument never relied on.
Winning move
Find the assumption the argument depends on, then pick the choice that undermines it.
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