PT158 · S3 · Q16 If a belief is based on information

The passage says nothing about beliefs without observable evidence being unreasonable. The first statement tells us beliefs from reliable sources ARE reasonable — but it does not tell us that beliefs WITHOUT observable evidence are unreasonable. A belief could lack observable evidence, lack a reliable source, and still be reasonable for some other reason not discussed in the passage. This answer makes a sweeping claim about all beliefs without observable evidence that the passage provides no basis for. The passage identifies one sufficient condition for reasonableness (reliable source) but never identifies any condition for unreasonableness.

The passage explicitly states the opposite for at least some beliefs: the second statement says some beliefs are based on reliable sources and are NOT self-evident. If those beliefs were self-evident, the second statement would be contradicted. Nothing in the passage supports the claim that reliable-source beliefs are self-evident. The passage treats "reliable source" and "self-evident" as independent properties — a belief can have one without the other. This answer incorrectly conflates two properties the passage carefully keeps separate.

This answer claims that ALL reasonable beliefs without observable evidence are based on information from a reliable source. The passage only establishes that being based on a reliable source is one sufficient condition for reasonableness. There could be other paths to reasonableness that the passage does not mention — perhaps logical coherence, widespread agreement, or some other factor. The passage tells us reliable-source beliefs are reasonable, but it never says reliable sources are the ONLY way to be reasonable without observable evidence. This answer converts a one-way sufficient condition into an exhaustive claim about all reasonable beliefs lacking observable evidence.

This answer claims: if a belief is not grounded in observable evidence, then it is not self-evident either. The passage provides no basis for linking these two properties in this way. Observable evidence and self-evidence are treated as independent properties in the passage. The second statement mentions beliefs that lack BOTH properties, but that does not mean lacking one entails lacking the other. A belief could be self-evident (like a basic logical truth) without being grounded in observable evidence, or grounded in observable evidence without being self-evident. The passage's description of beliefs lacking both properties does not establish a conditional relationship between the two.