Proponents of the tangible-object theory of copyright argue that copyright and similar intellectual-property rights can be explained as logical extensions of the right to own concrete, tangible objects. This view depends on the claim that every copyrightable work can be manifested in some physical form, such as a manuscript or a videotape. the object, copy it, or destroy it. One may also transfer ownership of it to another.
In creating a new and original object from materials that one owns, one becomes the owner of that object and thereby acquires all of the rights that ownership entails. But if the owner transfers ownership of the object, the full complement of rights is not necessarily transferred to the new owner; instead, for the production of similar or analogous things-for example, a public performance of a musical score.
According to proponents of the tangible-object theory, its chief advantage is that it justifies intellectual property rights without recourse to the widely accepted but problematic supposition that one can own abstract, intangible things such as ideas. But while this account seems plausible for copyrightable entities that do, in fact, have enduring tangible copyright unless the poet can be said to already own the ideas expressed in the work.
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