Dworkin and Legal Positivists

Answer choices

1. A

   Contradicted8% picked this

   Judges sometimes ought to be allowed to use personal moral convictions as a basis for

   The first sentence of the 2nd paragraph says that "law and morality are wholly distinct", and the last sentence of that paragraph says that "the judge's role is limited to discerning consensus, or the absence thereof".

   8%
2. B

   Too Strong: never4% picked this

   Disagreements about the meaning of a law are

   We're told in the 2nd and 3rd sentences of the 2nd paragraph, The meaning of the law rests on social convention .... disagreement among jurists is legitimate only if it arises over what the underlying convention is So there's definitely a chance for disagreement about the meaning of a law to be legitimate.

   4%
3. C

   Contradicted23% picked this

   The ultimate standard of interpretation is the logic of the law itself,

   The ultimate standard, to logical positivists, is not the internal logic of the law (that's the author's idea) but rather social convention. In that 2nd sentence of the 2nd paragraph: the meaning of the law rests on social convention

   23%
4. D

   Correct45% picked this

   The meaning of a law derives from jurists’ interpretations of

   Why this is right

   The job of the jurists, according to logical positivists in the 2nd paragraph, is to figure out the meaning of a law. The meaning of a law rests on social convention in the same way as does the meaning of a word ... disagreement about the meaning of a word is settled by determining how people actually use it, and not by deciding what it ought to mean. So the jurists are trying to figure out the meaning of laws by thinking about how people would use the wording in that law, not by what that wording ought to mean or what moral force that law ought to have. If they all agree, "Yeah, this is what we think that law means", then they've reached a consensus and there is a legal fact of the matter. When there is no consensus, there is no legal fact of the matter. When they disagree, they're only disagreeing (legitimately) about what the underlying social convention is for the meaning of the words in this law. So since logical positivists think jurists should be coming to a consensus about what a law means (in reality, not in aspirational moral ways) and since they think that when jurists reach a consensus (but not otherwise) we get our legal fact of the matter, then it sounds like the meaning of the law is determined by the process of the jurists interpreting / deliberating / ultimately agreeing on how that law would be popularly understood. What's pretty confusing about this notion is that jurists are seemingly playing the role of middle man, interpreting what Joe Q. Public would think this law means. They are trying to agree to what society's general understanding of this law would be, so in a sense they're really thinking, "What would be an average person's interpretation of this law?" But they are also an average person! They're essentially checking within themselves to think about what it seems to mean, and if they all agree with each other then they know there's a strong social convention when it comes to understanding the meaning. So even if they're interpreting what society's understanding of a law would be, they're still doing that by reading the letter of the law, so they are still interpreting that law.

   Skill tested: Author Opinion · how this choice captures the passage's function is the move to repeat next time.

   45%
5. E

   Wrong Trigger19% picked this

   There is no legal fact of the matter when jurists have differing moral convictions

   In the 2nd to last sentence of the 2nd paragraph it provides a rule: When there is no consensus → no legal fact (as to the underlying social of the matter convention about what this law means) This answer is replacing that actual trigger with some notion about "differing moral convictions", but we know that the logical positivists didn't think that morality had any role to play here. Law and morality are wholly distinct.

   19%