Reading ComprehensionDifficulty: Hard

PT111 S2 P4 Q25 Explanation

Dworkin and Legal Positivists

A free, expert breakdown of this official LSAT Reading Comprehension question.

TopicsNon-Author OpinionLaw

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Passage

Ronald Dworkin argues that judges are in danger of uncritically embracing an erroneous theory known as legal positivism because they think that the only alternative is a theory that they (and Dworkin) see as clearly unacceptable—natural law. The latter theory holds that judges ought to interpret the law by consulting their own impermissible form of judicial activism that arrogates to judges powers properly reserved for legislators.

Legal positivism, the more popular of the two theories, holds that law and morality are wholly distinct. The meaning of the law rests on social convention in the same way as does the meaning of a word. Dworkin’s view is that legal positivists regard disagreement among jurists as legitimate only if it the matter. The judge’s interpretive role is limited to discerning this consensus, or the absence thereof.

According to Dworkin, this account is incompatible with the actual practice of judges and lawyers, who act as if there is a fact of the matter even in cases where there is no consensus. The theory he proposes seeks to validate this practice without falling into what Dworkin correctly sees as the to impose their own morality at will, without regard to the internal logic of the laws.

The positivist’s mistake, as Dworkin points out, is assuming that the meaning of the law can only consist in what people think it means, whether these people be the original authors of the law or a majority of the interpreter’s peers. Once we realize, as Dworkin does, that the law has an the interpretations not only of our contemporaries but of the original authors.

What this question is testing

Non-Author Opinion

Your task

Pin down exactly what the question asks about the passage — a detail, the author's view, the structure, or the main point — before looking at the choices.

Common trap

Answers that restate a true detail from the passage but don't answer the specific question being asked.

Winning move

Anticipate the answer in your own words from the passage, then find the choice that matches that prediction.

Reading along? Open the full official question in LawHub — we show a fragment here and keep the reasoning in our own words.

The question
25.

The passage suggests that Dworkin would be most likely to agree with which one of

Answer choices

  1. Too Accusatory: too often23% picked this

    Judges and lawyers too often act as though there is a fact of the matter

    The language of this answer sounds like the first sentence of the 3rd paragraph. In that sentence, Dworkin is reporting that what goes on in real life is that judges and lawyers "act as if there is a fact of the matter", even in cases where there is no consensus. This answer choice is making it seem like Dworkin is complaining that they often act as though there is a fact of the matter.

  2. Opposite, if anything19% picked this

    Judges should not use their moral intuition when it conflicts with the intentions of those legislators who authored

    In the final sentence, the author/Dworkin are saying that judges can improve upon the intended meanings of the original authors. Dworkin would say that judges shouldn't use their moral intuition when it conflicts with the internal logic of the law.

  3. Out of Scope: popular Unsupported: simplifies3% picked this

    Legal positivism is a more popular theory than natural law theory because legal positivism simplifies

    The passage, and Dworkin, never weights in on which theory is more popular, or why. It's also not clear the judges role is simpler in legal positivism (where they have to determine whether there is a consensus on the used-meaning of a law) or in natural law (where they just have to consult their own moral convictions).

  4. Opposite: shouldn't examine internal logic4% picked this

    If there is consensus about how to interpret a law, then jurists should not examine the internal logic

    This answer is basically saying Dworkin would say, If you can manage to do the legal positivist's thing (register consensus), then don't bother doing my thing (examine internal logic)

  5. Correct51% picked this

    Legal positivists misunderstand the role of moral intuition in

    Why this is right

    Dworkin thinks natural law is cray-cray, for telling judges to just consult their own moral convictions, but he thinks that legal positivists go too far in the other direction by removing all moral considerations. Dworkin says in the last two sentences of the 3rd paragraph: judges may be called upon to consult their own moral intuitions in arriving at an interpretation. Meanwhile, the final sentence of the 2nd paragraph is a nice distillation of what the legal positivists believe: the judge's interpretive role is limited to discerning a consensus, or absence thereof If the positivists think that legal interpretation is limited to discerning a consensus, then they don't think that legal interpretation involves consulting one's moral intuition. But Dworkin disagrees.

    Skill tested: Non-Author Opinion · how this choice captures the passage's function is the move to repeat next time.

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