Ronald Dworkin argues that judges are in danger of uncritically embracing an erroneous theory known as legal positivism because they think that the only alternative is a theory that they (and Dworkin) see as clearly unacceptable—natural law.
Topic
Ronald Dworkin's critique of legal positivism and natural law, and his alternative theory about how judges should interpret law.
Framework
Challenge Position (Dworkin is critiquing both legal positivism and natural law, and offering his own improved middle ground)
Main Point
Dworkin argues that both legal positivism and natural law misrepresent how judges should interpret law; instead, he proposes that judges should be guided by the internal logic and general principles embodied in a society’s laws, even consulting their own moral intuitions when appropriate, but always in accordance with the law’s internal logic—not by consensus or unchecked personal morality. The Most Valuable Sentence: End of P3:
P1: Framing the Debate & Initial Critique
Dworkin says many judges feel stuck between two flawed theories: natural law (letting judges rule by their own morals, which he thinks is bad judicial activism) and legal positivism (which he sees as more popular, but wrong).
P2: Explaining Legal Positivism
Legal positivism says law and morality are totally separate; the law’s meaning is based on social conventions, with judges acting only to find group consensus, not what is morally right.
P3: Dworkin’s Middle-Ground Approach
Dworkin thinks this consensus-only view doesn’t fit what judges and lawyers actually do. He suggests instead that good legal interpretations follow the legal system’s own internal principles—even when there’s no consensus. Judges may draw on ideas like justice and fairness, but must stay true to the law’s logic and not just follow their personal beliefs.