Reading Comprehension

PT111 · S2 · P4 · Q21 Dworkin and Legal Positivists

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Ronald Dworkin argues that judges are in danger of uncritically embracing an erroneous theory known as legal positivism because they think that the only alternative is a theory that they (and Dworkin) see as clearly unacceptable—natural law.

Topic

Ronald Dworkin's critique of legal positivism and natural law, and his alternative theory about how judges should interpret law.

Framework

Challenge Position (Dworkin is critiquing both legal positivism and natural law, and offering his own improved middle ground)

Main Point

Dworkin argues that both legal positivism and natural law misrepresent how judges should interpret law; instead, he proposes that judges should be guided by the internal logic and general principles embodied in a society’s laws, even consulting their own moral intuitions when appropriate, but always in accordance with the law’s internal logic—not by consensus or unchecked personal morality. The Most Valuable Sentence: End of P3:

P1: Framing the Debate & Initial Critique

Dworkin says many judges feel stuck between two flawed theories: natural law (letting judges rule by their own morals, which he thinks is bad judicial activism) and legal positivism (which he sees as more popular, but wrong).

P2: Explaining Legal Positivism

Legal positivism says law and morality are totally separate; the law’s meaning is based on social conventions, with judges acting only to find group consensus, not what is morally right.

P3: Dworkin’s Middle-Ground Approach

Dworkin thinks this consensus-only view doesn’t fit what judges and lawyers actually do. He suggests instead that good legal interpretations follow the legal system’s own internal principles—even when there’s no consensus. Judges may draw on ideas like justice and fairness, but must stay true to the law’s logic and not just follow their personal beliefs.

21.

Which one of the following most accurately expresses the main point of the passage?

  1. Dworkin regards natural law theory

    Too Neutral

    The main clause here is saying, "Dworkin regards natural law as a middle ground between legal positivism and judicial activism". That doesn't contain any wording that sounds like, "Dworkin think that both natural law and legal positivism are bad". Dworkin regards his own theory as a middle ground between natural law and legal positivism.

    3% picked this

  2. Correct

    Dworkin holds that judicial interpretations

    Why this is right

    This answer is saying, "Dworkin doesn't like the idea that interpretation is based solely on moral intuition (Natural Law), and doesn't like the idea that interpretation is based solely on consensus (Legal Positivism). He instead suggests a middle ground that stresses the internal logic of the law (the reasoning that underlies the law)."

    Skill tested: Main Point · how this choice captures the passage's function is the move to repeat next time.

    85% picked this

  3. Dworkin argues that the internal

    Out of Scope: exceptions

    This answer is basically saying, "Dworkin argues that judges should primarily be interpreting based on internal logic (Dworkin's way), except in cases where there's consensus (legal positivism) or judges want to consult their own moral intuitions (natural law)." Dworkin wasn't saying, "Here's my idea, which we can do whenever Natural Law or Legal Positivism isn't called for." He was saying, "Natural Law and Legal Positivism are dumb. Let's do my idea."

    5% picked this

  4. Dworkin’s theory of legal interpretation

    Too Strong: borrowing equally

    We're told that the theory Dworkin proposes "represents a kind of middle ground between natural law and legal positivism", but that's a fuzzy expression. This answer is going overboard in saying that his theory borrows equally. Dworkin finds natural law to be an impermissible form of judicial activism. He's not borrowing from it. His theory is just a type of middle ground on the continuum between "always use moral intuition" (natural law) and "never use moral intuition" (legal positivism).

    6% picked this

  5. Dworkin validates judges’ dependence on

    Out of Scope

    Out of Scope: exceptions Too Strong: only / dependence Dworkin does validate the fact that judges sometimes use their moral intuition. He's not saying they should depend on it (that's more like natural law, which he doesn't like). But most importantly, the author never says, "If a social consensus is present, then judges should stop using moral intuition, reason, and the intent of the authors of the law."

    2% picked this

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