PT152 · S2 · Q20 Pulford: Scientists who study

This is a tough answer to disprove, for me. Does Pulford explicitly state a principle? Yes, and I would even say Pulford states two principles. Pulford's second sentence is definitely a principle (it uses normative language like should / ought / justified). Does Varela dispute the validity of the second sentence? Not really. Disputing the validity of that would be saying that "some investigations into health history were justified, even though they weren't done for the advancement of scientific knowledge". Varela doesn't say anything to that effect. Does Varela dispute the validity of the first sentence? Yes, I think? Isn't Varela sort of saying, "they don't need to first ask themselves 'Is this legit inquiry or just curiosity', since curiosity is at the root of inquiry." I can't tell if LSAC thinks we should get rid of this answer because we're not supposed to consider the first sentence to be an explicit principle. I would say a statement structured like "people who do X need do first do Y" sounds like a principle to me. So does LSAC think that Varela doesn't really dispute the validity? Disputing the validity of principles / conditional ideas usually (or always) means that you think there's at least one counterexample. Is Varela arguing that there's at least one case in which a scientist is studying ancient remains of a historical figure for the sake of health history, and doesn't need to first ask "is this legit or just curiosity"? She certainly isn't sounding that specific. My theory is that LSAC finds this inferior to (A) because Varela isn't giving a clear indication whether we should reject the principle or whether following it would be very tricky, since there's no clear separation between "legit inquiry" and "just curious". The language of (A) is softer. It's easy to point out where there's an untenable distinction. The language of (B) is harsher: your explicit principle is invalid! Varela's paragraph is more suggestive food for thought than it is directly confrontational disagreement.

A counterexample to a generalization is a specific situation in which the trigger was true but the outcome was not. Is Varela offering a specific case in which a scientist is studying ancient remains of a historical figure for the sake of health history, and doesn't need to first ask "is this legit or just curiosity"? Varela offers some unnamed specific cases in her second sentence, saying that there are examples of great scientific discoveries that were motivated by mere curiosity, but we don't know if these great discoveries had anything to do with investigating the health history of a historical figure via their remains, so we can't count that 2nd sentence from Varela as a counterexample to Pulford's 1st sentence.

Varela is actually saying the two views that Pulford treats as distinct are more like a single view, since curiosity is the root of legit inquiry.

"Inconsistent" premises = contradictory premises Is Varela accusing Pulford of having contradicted himself? No. Also, Pulford only has one premise (the 2nd sentence), so it would be impossible to have contradictory premises if you only have one of them.