Reading ComprehensionDifficulty: Medium

PT145 S3 P3 Q17 Explanation

Communication Systems

A free, expert breakdown of this official LSAT Reading Comprehension question.

TopicsWeakenScience

Keep going in LSAT Lab

  • Save & drill this skill — build targeted practice sets from questions like this one

  • Video walkthroughs — watch every question solved step by step

  • 81 official LSATs — as questions, timed sections & full-length tests

Start practicing free

Free to start

Full official LSAT questions are available through LawHub. This page provides LSAT Lab's explanation, strategy, and review tools without republishing the full official question.

Passage

Passage A One function of language is to influence others’ behavior by changing what they know, believe, or desire. For humans engaged in conversation, the perception of the most common vocalization stimulus.

While animal vocalizations may have evolved because they can potentially alter listeners’ behavior to the signaler’s benefit, such communication is—in contrast to human language—inadvertent, because most animals, with the possible exception of chimpanzees, cannot attribute mental states to others. The male Physalaemus frog calls because calling causes females to approach and other Many animal vocalizations whose production initially seems goal-directed are not as purposeful as they first appear.

Passage B Many scientists distinguish animal communication systems from human language on the grounds that the former are rigid responses to is spontaneous and creative.

In this connection, it is commonly stated that no animal can use its communication system to lie. Obviously, a lie requires intention to deceive: to judge whether a particular instance of animal communication is truly prevarication requires knowledge of the animal’s intentions. Language philosopher H. P. Grice explains that for an individual merely a conditioned reflex: animals may use communicative signs but lack conscious intention regarding their use.

But these arguments are circular: conscious intention is ruled out a priori and then its absence taken as evidence that animal communication is fundamentally different from human language. In fact, the narrowing of the perceived gap between animal communication and human language revealed by recent research with chimpanzees and other animals calls that animals respond mechanically to stimuli, whereas humans speak with conscious understanding and intent.

What this question is testing

Weaken

Your task

Find the choice that makes the argument's conclusion less likely to be true.

Common trap

Answers that look negative but attack a claim the argument never relied on.

Winning move

Find the assumption the argument depends on, then pick the choice that undermines it.

Reading along? Open the full official question in LawHub — we show a fragment here and keep the reasoning in our own words.

The question
17.

Which one of the following assertions from passage A provides support for the view attributed to Maritain in passage B (end of second

Answer choices

  1. Unrelated to Goal1% picked this

    One function of language is to influence the behavior of others by changing

    This line doesn't suggest anything about whether nonhuman animal communication is unconscious, inadvertent, or instinctual.

  2. Unrelated to Goal5% picked this

    Animal vocalizations may have evolved because they have the potential to alter listeners' behavior to

    This line doesn't suggest anything about whether nonhuman animal communication is unconscious, inadvertent, or instinctual. This, like (A), is talking about the function or effect of vocalizations. But our job on this problem is to talk about the mental state of the animal vocalizing. Is that animal or isn't it having conscious intention when it communicates?

  3. Opposite-ish1% picked this

    It is possible that chimpanzees may have the capacity to attribute mental

    This would be going the wrong way, since we're looking to match Maritain's claim that nonhuman animals are not having conscious intention, are not attributing mental states to others. This answer sounds like a nonhuman animal may actually have that capacity.

  4. Correct77% picked this

    There is no evidence that the male Physalaemus frog calls because he knows that his calls will affect

    Why this is right

    No evidence that the frog calls because he knows that his calls will affect the knowledge of other frogs. This answer is about the mental state of the animal doing the communicating. Are they just going off instinct, or do they perceive another animal's mental state and seek to change it? According to this answer and to Maritain, the animal is just reflexively doing its thing, without conscious intention / without an understanding of other animals' mental states.

    Skill tested: Weaken · how this choice captures the passage's function is the move to repeat next time.

  5. Not About Mental State16% picked this

    Macaques give alarm calls when predators approach and coo calls upon

    This describes the type of communication that macaques do, but it doesn't offer any commentary on what the mental state of the macaques is while they're doing it. If we were picking a macaque line to match up, it would be this line: "no evidence that individuals were more likely to call about these events when they were aware of them but their offspring were clearly ignorant". That's the line where Passage A is saying, like Maritain, "Sure, they're communicating. But they don't know what they're doing. They aren't thinking about what others know / don't know / need to know."

Continue the review in LSAT Lab

Save this question, watch the video walkthrough, and drill similar questions in your LSAT Lab account.

Save and practice this skill
LSAT Lab

Turn this review into a targeted study plan.

Save this question, drill more like it, watch the video walkthrough, and track your progress in your LSAT Lab account.

Start practicing free