Reading Comprehension

PT145 · S3 · P3 · Q17 Communication Systems

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Passage A One function of language is to influence others’ behavior by changing what they know, believe, or desire.

Topic

The differences and similarities between animal communication and human language, especially focusing on mental states, intention, and the possibility of purposeful communication.

Framework

Present Debate (particularly for Passage B); Highlight Noteworthy (for Passage A, which is more informative/comparative)

Main Point

**Passage A:** Animal vocalizations, unlike human language, generally lack intentional communication based on attributing mental states to others—even when they seem purposeful, they are likely automatic responses, not truly purposeful acts based on others' knowledge or needs. **Passage B:** The usual claim that animal communication differs fundamentally from human language due to a lack of conscious intention might be circular and oversimplified; recent research suggests the gap may not be as large or clear-cut as previously thought. - Most Valuable Sentence Passage A: Last line of the first paragraph: - Most Valuable Sentence Passage B: End of last paragraph:

P1: Passage A - Function of Language & Comparison to Animal Vocalizations

The author begins by reminding us that a key function of language is to get others to change what they think, know, or want. For humans, reading other people's minds (in a sense) and responding to perceived needs is a big part of conversation.

P2: Passage A - Differences Between Human and Animal Communication

The passage argues that animal vocalizations, although sometimes evolved to benefit the signaling animal, are unconscious and not guided by an understanding of other animals' mental states. Unlike people, animals (except perhaps chimps) don't seem to communicate based on what they think another animal knows or needs; experimental evidence from frogs, macaques, and chimps shows animal calls are not tailored to inform ignorant individuals.

P1: Passage B - The Conventional Distinction

The passage starts by highlighting a traditional scientific view: animal communication is rigid and reflexive, while human language is flexible and creative.

17.

Which one of the following assertions from passage A provides support for the view attributed to Maritain in the final sentence of the second paragraph of passage B?

  1. One function of language is

    Unrelated to Goal

    This line doesn't suggest anything about whether nonhuman animal communication is unconscious, inadvertent, or instinctual.

    1% picked this

  2. Animal vocalizations may have evolved

    Unrelated to Goal

    This line doesn't suggest anything about whether nonhuman animal communication is unconscious, inadvertent, or instinctual. This, like (A), is talking about the function or effect of vocalizations. But our job on this problem is to talk about the mental state of the animal vocalizing. Is that animal or isn't it having conscious intention when it communicates?

    5% picked this

  3. It is possible that chimpanzees

    Opposite-ish

    This would be going the wrong way, since we're looking to match Maritain's claim that nonhuman animals are not having conscious intention, are not attributing mental states to others. This answer sounds like a nonhuman animal may actually have that capacity.

    1% picked this

  4. Correct

    There is no evidence that

    Why this is right

    No evidence that the frog calls because he knows that his calls will affect the knowledge of other frogs. This answer is about the mental state of the animal doing the communicating. Are they just going off instinct, or do they perceive another animal's mental state and seek to change it? According to this answer and to Maritain, the animal is just reflexively doing its thing, without conscious intention / without an understanding of other animals' mental states.

    Skill tested: Weaken · how this choice captures the passage's function is the move to repeat next time.

    78% picked this

  5. Macaques give alarm calls when

    Not About Mental State

    This describes the type of communication that macaques do, but it doesn't offer any commentary on what the mental state of the macaques is while they're doing it. If we were picking a macaque line to match up, it would be this line: "no evidence that individuals were more likely to call about these events when they were aware of them but their offspring were clearly ignorant". That's the line where Passage A is saying, like Maritain, "Sure, they're communicating. But they don't know what they're doing. They aren't thinking about what others know / don't know / need to know."

    15% picked this

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