The recent concert was probably not properly promoted.
Evidence
Wells (a knowledgeable person on this subject) says, .
The concert did not sell out.
Conclusion
The concert was probably poorly promoted.
Evaluate
Since we see conditional logic (unless) and repeating symbols (sell out / poorly promoted each mentioned twice), we would probably try to turn this into an abstract recipe.
Premise 1: Sell out unless poorly promoted. ~PP → SO ~SO → PP
Premise 2: Concert didn't sell out. concert was ~SO.
Conclusion: Concert was probably poorly promoted. concert was probably PP.
This seems like valid logic; in fact, it's weird that the conclusion is hedging its certainly by saying "probably poorly promoted". We have a conditional rule that says, "If it didn't sell out, then poorly promoted". We know this concert didn't sell out. So shouldn't we be sure of concluding, "Thus, is was poorly promoted"?
The reason the author is softening her certainty is because we don't "know" this conditional rule of "if didn't sell out, then poorly promoted". It's not presented as a fact. It's presented as a certain opinion of Wells.
The author does trust Wells, who is quite knowledgeable on this topic, but she is also probably thinking people are sometimes wrong. Wells is probably right about this, since he is knowledgeable, and if he is right, then the concert was definitely poorly promoted. So the concert was probably poorly promoted.
Goal
If we're really on top of our game, we want to include this appeal to expert opinion as part of the way we understand the structure of this argument.
If we don't notice that layer, we'll go looking for something like this.
Premise 1: A → B Premise 2: X was B. Conclusion: X was probably A.
If we do notice that layer, we should be looking for something like this,
Premise 1: Trusted source says, "A → B" Premise 2: X was B. Conclusion: X was probably A.