A letter submitted to the editor of a national news magazine was written and signed by a Dr. Shirley Martin who, in the text of the letter, mentions being a professor at a major North American medical school.
Conclusion
The chances are better than 19 to 1 that letter was written by a man.
Evidence
The letter writer is a professor at a major North American medical school.
Fewer than 5% of the professors at such schools are women.
Evaluate
5% = 1/20, so if 5% (1/20) of the professors at such schools are women, 19/20 of the professors are men.
Thus, at these schools, the ratio of female to male professors is 1 : 19.
If we were to pick a random professor, we'd have a 1/20 chance of getting a woman and 19/20 chance of getting a man.
If fewer than 5% of these professors are women then the chances are worse than 1/20 that a random professor would be a woman and better than 19/20 (or better than 19 to 1) that a random professor would be a man.
So why is this flawed?
Because the Doctor's name is Shirley! That's typically a female name. It's certainly still possible that this is a male doctor named Shirley, but given how much more we hear the name Shirley as a female name than as a male name, it should drastically shift our sense of probability.
Goal
Basically, the editor's conclusion is basing probability purely on the underlying population of male / female professors, and it's failing to make use of the 2nd piece of information we know (the writer's name is Shirley) as a means of editing or re-thinking probability.
Let's look for an answer where the argument is estimating probability based only some background numerical fact while failing to consider some second fact that should probably shift their sense of probability.