Logical ReasoningDifficulty: Hard

PT108 S3 Q23 Explanation

Commentator: A political constitution that

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TopicsMost Supported

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Stimulus

Commentator: A political constitution that provides the framework for the laws of a nation must be interpreted to apply to new situations not envisioned by its authors. Although these interpretations express the moral and political beliefs of the interpreters, they are usually portrayed as embodying the intentions of the authors. This fiction of a long tradition rather than the preferences of contemporary politicians would vanish.

What this question is testing

Most Supported

Your task

Break the argument into its conclusion and evidence, then do exactly what the question stem asks with that structure.

Common trap

Answers that sound relevant to the topic but don't connect to the argument's actual reasoning.

Winning move

Predict what a right answer must do, then test each choice against the conclusion-evidence gap.

Reading along? Open the full official question in LawHub — we show a fragment here and keep the reasoning in our own words.

The question
23.

Which one of the following is most strongly supported by the commentator's statements, if

Answer choices

  1. Authors vs. Leaders8% picked this

    If the people of a nation do not believe that the laws under which they live express the intentions of their political leaders, that

    If we switched "political leaders" for "authors of the constitution", then this answer would be pretty close to reflecting the conversation. Today's political leaders have to pretend like their interpretations of the constitution express the intentions of the authors of the constitution, or else we don't feel like laws are the bequest of a long tradition, and thus we lose political stability. If we think laws are just the preferences of contemporary politicians (i.e. political leaders), the necessary fiction "would vanish".

  2. Correct54% picked this

    Political instability will increase if the people of a nation cease to believe that their constitution is being interpreted consistently with

    Why this is right

    This echoes the chain we put together: If they didn't we'd lose illusion lose make it sound → that laws are → political that (fictional) way part of tradition stability What is "this fictional way", that if it ceased would lead to the loss of our illusion and the loss of political stability? It's what's covered in the 2nd sentence -- we portray our modern interpretations of the constitution as though they embody the intentions of its authors. If we ceased perpetuating this fiction, and then people stopped thinking of the actions of contemporary politicians as though those actions embodied the authors' intentions, then we would lose the illusion of a long standing legal tradition and thus lose political stability. (Because this is Most Supported, not Must Be True, we're letting them get away with the "sloppy" move of switching from an Absolute concept of yes/no political stability to a Relative concept of more/less political instability).

    Skill tested: Most Supported · how this choice captures the argument's function is the move to repeat next time.

  3. Too Strong: divergence of beliefs18% picked this

    Political instability will ensue if people come to believe there is a divergence between the beliefs of the authors of their constitution and

    This is very, very similar to (B). However, in (B), we only lose our illusion and our stability when we start to believe something pretty significant -- "the constitution is no longer being interpreted consistently with the intentions of the authors!" In (C), the trigger is too easily fired, because all you need to trigger this is a belief that there is any difference (divergence) between the beliefs of contemporary leaders and those of the constitution's authors. This rule doesn't limit that divergence to political / moral beliefs. Like if modern politicians believe that the Sun is primarily hydrogen/helium whereas the authors of the constitution believed (in the 1800s) that the Sun was primarily iron, that would trigger this rule. People could be fine with accepting that their political leaders have some differing beliefs with the authors of the constitution, as long as people still believe that the leaders are consistently upholding the constitution.

  4. Out of Scope11% picked this

    A written constitution preserves the illusion that laws are the bequest of a long tradition rather than the

    Out of Scope: written constitution Wrong Causal Factor We never specify whether a written or oral constitution is being authored, so that specificity is out of scope. Moreover, the paragraph identifies that the causal factor that preserves the illusion of a long standing legal tradition is "making it seem like modern interpretations of novel situations are in fact embodying the intentions of the authors".

  5. Unsupported Causal Connection9% picked this

    The perceived lack of a long legal tradition in a nation makes the political stability of that nation dependent upon the fiction that its

    This answer does a little word salad with the three concepts in our conditional chain. Here is what we were able to derive: If they didn't we'd lose illusion lose make it sound → that laws are → political that (fictional) way part of tradition stability A → B → C And this answer is saying that B is what causes A to require C. That's actually kind of tempting, because in a conditional sense, B is what links A to C and thus B is what makes C a necessary implication of A. But the problem is the causal verb "makes", not the conditional logic. Suppose we said this: Getting into Harvard requires a good LSAT score, which requires that you can read/write in English. Is it fair to derive from that "The need for a good LSAT score makes getting into Harvard dependent on being able to read/write in English"? No. That need may exist independently of needing a good LSAT score. After all, getting into Harvard requires submitting personal statements, which requires knowing how to read/write in English. Even though 3 things are all connected in a chain of requirements, we can't automatically say that the second thing is what causes there to be a dependent relationship between the 1st and 3rd.

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